A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks | SpringerLinkSkip to search form Skip to main content. Jackson , Alison Watts Published in J. Economic Theory DOI: Over time, individuals form and sever links connecting themselves to other individuals based on the improvement the resulting network offers them relative to the current network. Such a process creates a sequence of networks that we call an 'improving path'.
Social and Economic Networks 4.1 Week 4: Strategic Network Formation
Matthew O. Jackson
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Many economic, political, and social interactions are shaped by the local networks exhibit heterogeneity, but also have enough underlying.
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Matthew O. Many of our ebooks are available through library electronic resources including these platforms:. Networks of relationships help determine the careers that people choose, the jobs they obtain, the products they buy, and how they vote. The many aspects of our lives that are governed by social networks make it critical to understand how they impact behavior, which network structures are likely to emerge in a society, and why we organize ourselves as we do. In Social and Economic Networks , Matthew Jackson offers a comprehensive introduction to social and economic networks, drawing on the latest findings in economics, sociology, computer science, physics, and mathematics. He provides empirical background on networks and the regularities that they exhibit, and discusses random graph-based models and strategic models of network formation.
Networks and Groups pp Cite as. We study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks, when self-interested individuals can form or sever links. First, for two stylized models, we characterize the stable and efficient networks. There does not always exist a stable network that is efficient. Next, we show that this tension persists generally: to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient, one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production. We characterize one such allocation rule: the equal split rule, and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players. Unable to display preview.